Toplines Russia conducted a massive combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of September 29 to 30, primarily targeting energy infrastructure in Kyiv City and marking the beginning of Russia’s strike campaign aimed at degrading Ukraine’s energy security ahead of Winter 2026-2027 and forcing Ukraine to capitulate. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on September 30 that Russian forces launched nearly 190 strike drones and an unspecified number of ballistic missiles against Ukraine overnight, primarily targeting Kyiv City and Kyiv Oblast energy infrastructure.[1] Ukrainian Prime Minister Serhiy Koretskyi stated that this recent strike package is the largest combined strike package targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure since the end of the last heating season (roughly early April 2026).[2] Ukrainian energy company Centrenergo reported on September 30 that Russian strikes damaged the Trypillya Thermal Power Plant (TPP) in Kyiv Oblast.[3] Ukrainian state energy company Ukrenergo introduced emergency power outages in Kyiv Oblast following Russian strikes.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 30 that Russian forces also struck the Kyivska electrical substation, the Kyiv Hydroelectric Power Plant, and a battery energy storage park in Kyiv Oblast.[5] A Ukrainian monitoring channel reported that Russia will systematically and methodically attempt to strike Ukrainian electricity generation and transmission facilities in order to disconnect Ukraine’s nuclear power plants from the unified grid, cut off Kyiv City from external power supplies, and destroy energy infrastructure in Ukraine’s industrial east.[6] Ukraine’s Minister of Economy Oleksandr Kravchenko stated that Winter 2026-2027 could be the “hardest and the harshest winter” of the war thus far, with intensified Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.[7] Russia notably began its Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure ahead of Ukraine’s heating season, as Russian President Vladimir Putin likely recently adopted a modified theory of victory that relies on Russia’s long-range strike campaign to force Ukraine to surrender over Winter 2026-2027. ISW recently assessed that Ukraine’s 2026 battlefield successes may be forcing Putin to reevaluate his original theory of victory and shift his rhetoric (and possibly his strategy) to focus on compelling Ukraine to surrender using Russia’s long-range strike campaign.[8] Putin is likely beginning the systematic combined strikes campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure before Ukraine can adequately protect its energy grid and develop countermeasures to Russian ballistic missiles and jet-powered drones. Putin is likely also attempting to demoralize the Ukrainian population and force Ukraine to surrender before the start of any meaningful peace negotiations, on which Ukraine and its US partners are currently working.[9] A likely Russian drone violated Moldovan airspace and crashed near Hirbovat, Anenii Noi, on the morning of September 30. The Moldovan police reported on September 30 that an unspecified drone crashed and exploded near Hirbovat, Anenii Noi Raion (roughly 18 kilometers from the Ukrainian-Moldovan border) early in the morning on September 30.[10] Geolocated footage published on September 30 shows the drone striking a radio tower southeast of Hirbovat.[11] ISW continues to assess that Russian drone incursions, whether intentional or accidental, are likely part of the Kremlin’s efforts to normalize airspace violations, as they both become more regular and more dangerous.[12] The Kremlin is signaling its intention to use the seizure of assets belonging to European companies operating in Russia and to hold such companies’ assets hostage in order to coerce European states into reconsidering their sanctions policies against Russia. A senior Kremlin official with direct knowledge of recent Russian seizures of assets belonging to prominent European companies operating in Russia stated on September 30 that Russia is taking “asymmetric measures” to compel European states to reconsider their sanctions policies against Russia.[13] The Kremlin official did not rule out the possibility of the Kremlin seizing Russian assets of Italian bank UniCredit and Austrian bank Raiffeisen. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed decrees on September 17 and 28 that placed the assets of European enterprises — including French companies Auchan and Lemana PRO (formerly Leroy Merlin), Swiss company Nestlé, and German company Metro AG — under the indefinite “temporary management” of Russian companies.[14] The Kremlin is likely seeking to use these so-called temporary seizures of European assets to take commercial entities as corporate hostages and coerce affected states to reconsider their sanctions policies against Russia, as well as seek temporary fiscal bumps from the revenues of seized European assets.[15] This Kremlin strategy likely assumes that European corporations will decide that the benefits of continuing to operate in Russia outweigh the risks of the Kremlin seizing their assets. Whether the Kremlin decides to seize foreign assets operating in Russia depends entirely on the political situation between the Kremlin and the foreign states in which the companies are headquartered, as the Kremlin is seeking to hold foreign company assets in Russia as a corporate hostage to compel various states to lift sanctions against Russia. Key Takeaways Russia conducted a massive combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of September 29 to 30, primarily targeting energy infrastructure in Kyiv City and marking the beginning of Russia’s strike campaign aimed at degrading Ukraine’s energy security ahead of Winter 2026-2027 and forcing Ukraine to capitulate. Russia notably began its Winter 2026-2027 strike campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure ahead of Ukraine’s heating season, as Russian President Vladimir Putin likely recently adopted a modified theory of victory that relies on Russia’s long-range strike campaign to force Ukraine to surrender over Winter 2026-2027. A likely Russian drone violated Moldovan airspace and crashed near Hirbovat, Anenii Noi, on the morning of September 30. The Kremlin is signaling its intention to use the seizure of assets belonging to European companies operating in Russia and to hold such companies’ assets hostage in order to coerce European states into reconsidering their sanctions policies against Russia. Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Sumy City. Russian forces launched an unspecified number of Zircon or Onyx anti-ship cruise missiles, an unspecified number of Iskander-M or S-400 ballistic missiles, and 188 drones against Ukraine overnight on September 29 to 30; and 285 drones, an unspecified number of ballistic missiles, and several Banderol or Dan-T loitering munitions during the day on September 30. We do not report in detail on Russian war crimes because these activities are well-covered in Western media and do not directly affect the military operations we are assessing and forecasting. We will continue to evaluate and report on the effects of these criminal activities on the Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian population and specifically on combat in Ukrainian urban areas. We utterly condemn Russian violations of the laws of armed conflict and the Geneva Conventions and crimes against humanity even though we do not describe them in these reports. Ukrainian Operations in the Russian Federation Open-source imagery provided an updated battlefield damage assessment (BDA) of a recent Ukrainian strike against Russian military assets in Bryansk Oblast. Geolocated imagery published on September 30 shows damage to a hangar belonging to the Russian 856th Guards Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (144th Motorized Rifle Division, 20th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Moscow Military District [MMD], a pumping station, and an outbuilding belonging to the Russian 1032nd Separate Logistics Battalion (144th Motorized Rifle Division) in Pochep, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 64 kilometers from the frontline), following Ukrainian strikes on September 22.[16] Russian Supporting Effort: Northern Axis Russian objective: Create defensible buffer zones in Sumy Oblast along the international border Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Sumy City. Ukrainian forces recently advanced north of Korchakivka (north of Sumy City) based on geolocated footage published on September 29.[17] Russian sources continue to make unconfirmed claims of advance in northern Sumy Oblast. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 30 that Russian forces seized Tovstodubove (northwest of Sumy City).[18] The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces credited elements of the Russian Chechen 349th Akhmat-Russia Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Southern Military District [SMD], under the operational control of the Northern Grouping of Forces) with the claimed seizure of Tovstodubove.[19] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also advanced south of Prokhody and in Velykyi Prykil (both east of Sumy City).[20] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Kindrativka is a contested gray zone, despite previous Russian claims that Russian forces seized the settlement.[21] Russian Supporting Effort: Kharkiv Oblast Russian objective: Push Ukrainian forces back from the international border to create a defensible buffer zone with Belgorod Oblast and approach Kharkiv City Russian forces continued offensive operations in northern Kharkiv Oblast on September 29 to 30 but did not make confirmed advances as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[22] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 30 that Russian forces seized Shabelne (northeast of Kharkiv City).[23] The Russian Northern Grouping of Forces credited elements of the Russian 126th Motorized Rifle Regiment (71st Motorized Rifle Division [MRD], 14th Army Corps [AC], Leningrad Military District [LMD]) with the claimed seizure of Shabelne.[24] Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Velykyi Burluk direction on September 29 to 30 but did not advance.[25] Russian Supporting Effort: Oskil River Russian objective: Cross the Oskil River in Kharkiv Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction on September 29 and 30 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked in the area.[26] Russian forces continued limited offensive operations in the Borova direction on September 29 and 30 but did not advance.[27] Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Luhansk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian command and observation post in occupied Lysychansk (roughly 35 kilometers from the frontline) and a military repair base in occupied Starobilsk (roughly 66 kilometers from the frontline) on September 29 or on the night of September 29 to 30.[28] Russian Main Effort: Capture Ukraine’s Fortress Belt and complete the seizure of Donetsk Oblast Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the northwest Russian objective: Seize Lyman and cross the Siverskyi Donets River to support a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt – assessed objective of the Russian 25th Combined Arms Army and Western Grouping of Forces elements Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Lyman tactical effort on September 29 and 30 but did not advance, as Ukrainian forces continued counterattacks in the area.[29] Russian sources continue to push false narratives about Russian offensive efforts in the Lyman direction, refusing to acknowledge successful Ukrainian counterattacks during Operation Vivaldi. A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian sources are publishing false information about Ukrainian positions in Shandryholove (northwest of Lyman), that Russian forces retain positions in Lyman, and that Ukrainian forces have not cut off the Russian salient north of Lyman.[30] Ukrainian military observer Yuriy Butusov stated on September 30 that the Kremlin-instructed Russian milblogger channels are amplifying altered footage and false information to conceal Russian losses during successful Ukrainian counterattacks, including in Nove (north of Lyman).[31] ISW assesses that Ukrainian forces control both Nove and Shandryholove, with the closest assessed Russian positions being roughly at least 16 kilometers from Shandryholove and roughly at least 8.5 kilometers from Nove. Prominent voices within the Russian information space have however become increasingly critical of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) refusal to acknowledge Ukraine’s Operation Vivaldi and where the true frontline is.[32] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the east Russian objective: Advance on Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, and Druzhkivka from the east – assessed objective of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements Russian forces continued offensive operations northeast of Slovyansk near Pyskunivka and east of Slovyansk toward Mykolaivka on September 29 and 30 but did not advance.[33] A Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces counterattacked near Kalenyky (east of Mykolaivka) and Vasyutynske (east of Kramatorsk).[34] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #3 – Advance on the Fortress Belt from the south Russian objective: Advance on Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka from the south and southwest, east of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 8th Combined Arms Army and Southern Grouping of Forces elements Russian forces concentrated offensive operations near and southwest of Kostyantynivka and toward Oleksiievo-Druzhkivka on September 29 and 30 but did not advance as Ukrainian forces counterattacked north and northwest of Kostyantynivka.[35] Russian Subordinate Main Effort #4 – Encircle the Fortress Belt from the southwest Russian objective: Conduct a wide encirclement of the Fortress Belt from near Dobropillya and Pokrovsk west of the Kazenyi Torets River – assessed objective of the Russian 51st Combined Arms Army and Central Grouping of Forces elements Russian forces continued offensive operations south and northeast of Dobropillya on September 29 to 30 but did not advance.[36] Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Donetsk Oblast. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian drone depot in occupied Hranitne (one of two settlements roughly 91 or 99 kilometers from the frontline) and material and technical equipment depots in occupied Azovske, Manhush, Novoandriivka, and Volnovakha (all between 55 and 114 kilometers from the frontline) on September 29 or overnight September 29 to 30.[37] Russian Supporting Effort: Advance into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Russian objective: Interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication that support Ukrainian positions in Donetsk Oblast and envelop Ukrainian positions in southwestern Donetsk Oblast – assessed objective of elements of the Russian Central and Eastern groupings of forces Neither Russian nor Ukrainian forces reported ground activity in the Novopavlivka direction on September 30. Russian forces continued limited offensive operations southeast of Oleksandrivka on September 29 and 30 but did not advance.[38] Russian Supporting Effort: Southern Axis Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions, secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes, and advance within tube artillery range of Zaporizhzhia City – assessed objective of the Russian Eastern and Dnepr Grouping of Forces Russian forces conducted limited offensive operations in the Hulyaipole direction on September 29 and 30 but did not advance.[39] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues attempts to use flag-raising tactics to claim territory which Russian forces do not control. Four Russian servicemembers of the Russian 38th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (35th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]) raised flags in Yehorivka (northeast of Orikhiv) according to geolocated footage published on September 30.[40] ISW assesses that these flag-raisings were part of a Russian infiltration mission. The Russian MoD used the footage to claim that Russian forces had seized Yehorivka.[41] ISW continues to assess that flag-raising tactics are a systematic cognitive warfare effort to aggrandize Russian advances through exaggerated claims of gains and flag-raising infiltration missions to exaggerate Russian gains and create a false perception of military strength.[42] Neither Russian nor Ukrainian sources reported ground activity in the Kherson direction on September 29 or 30. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha called on the international community to address the humanitarian crisis in occupied Oleshky on September 30. Sybiha and Kherson Oblast Military Administrator Oleksandr Prokudin reported on September 30 that Russian forces in occupied Oleshky are conducting an information operation in the city by filming videos of residents receiving food packages and praising Russian forces occupying the city.[43] ISW has previously reported that residents of Oleshky face food and medicine shortages, that Russian forces have mined the roads out of the town, making escape difficult, and that Russian forces have mistreated the local population.[44] Ukrainian forces continued their intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian military assets in occupied Crimea. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 30 that Ukrainian forces struck a Russian material and technical equipment depot in occupied Kumove (roughly 107 kilometers from the frontline) either on September 29 or overnight on September 29 to 30.[45] Russian Air, Missile, and Drone Campaign Russian Objective: Target Ukrainian military and civilian infrastructure in the rear and on the frontline Significant Activity in Belarus Russian efforts to increase its military presence in Belarus and further integrate Belarus into Russian-favorable frameworks Note: ISW does not receive any classified material from any source, uses only publicly available information, and draws extensively on Russian, Ukrainian, and Western reporting and social media as well as commercially available satellite imagery and other geospatial data as the basis for these reports. References to all sources used are provided in the endnotes of each update. Endnotes [1] https://x.com/ZelenskyyUa/status/2105208503988031510[2] https://t.me/Koretskyi_official/672[3] dot com/pat-czentrenergo-vidklykaye-pozov-do-zhurnalistiv-bihus-info-ta-zminyuye-pidhid-do-vzayemodiyi-z-media-copy-copy-copy-copy-copy-copy-copy-2/?fbclid=IwY2xjawUpvhFleHRuA2FlbQIxMABwZG9mBXNydGMGYXBwX2lkEDIyMjAzOTE3ODgyMDA4OTIAAR77Nq5lY8VsiSwCfBRoskbzO4e29S2Z6IHckou1vncEsth9qMN-U0b-7BxcQQ_aem_W1gfdHzkwVLlxakmjNgRIw[4] https://www.facebook.com/npcukrenergo/posts/pfbid0UDpfDSj1mvec6rUne2SgdSPu9snxn2aMHajWPgBh9vCMDKpPEz8EXK8cPta2n62sl?rdid=pQa7z0dvDopUHsgd#[5] https://t.me/mod_russia/67770[6] dot com/uk/news/rosiya-pochala-kampaniyu-udariv-po-energetytsi-ukrayiny/[7] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/30/missile-alerts-cost-ukraine-businesses-halt[8] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/[9] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/[10] https://t.me/Politia_Republicii_Moldova/17029[11] ; ; ; https://t.me/supernova_plus/60744[12] ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-17-2026/[13] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/let-them-be-scared-moscow-sends-eu-message-with-widening-corporate-crackdown-2026-09-29/[14] ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/[15] ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-18-2026/[16] dot com/uk/news/u-misti-pochep-urazyly-vijskovi-chastyny/[17] https://x.com/jimmhelloman555/status/2105026777517080666?s=20;[18] https://t.me/mod_russia/67774[19] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/22304[20] https://t.me/divgen/84319[21] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48200[22] ;[23] https://t.me/mod_russia/67772[24] https://t.me/warriorofnorth/22305[25] [26] ; ; ; ; ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19937[27] ; ; https://t.me/grvZapad/19937[28] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42420[29] ; ; [30] https://t.me/DnevnikDesantnika/48212[31] https://t.me/ButusovPlus/33608[32] ; ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2026/[33] ; [34] [35] ; [36] https://t.me/motopatriot78/56388[37] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42420[38] https://t.me/voin_dv/21345[39] ; https://t.me/voin_dv/21345[40] ; ; ; ; https://x.com/richardzai38580/status/2105216387732164851[41] https://t.me/mod_russia/67776[42] ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-may-10-2026/[43] dot com.ua/2026/09/30/ukrayina-vynesla-na-rozglyad-obsye-gumanitarnu-katastrofu-v-okupovanyh-oleshkah/[44] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/[45] https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/42420[46] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-august-11-2026/[47] https://t.me/kpszsu/81648[48] https://t.me/kpszsu/81982[49] dot gov.ua/news/najblizhchimi-dnyami-ochikuyemo-horoshu-finansovu-novinu-vid-106629; dot media/cherkasy/1415372-u-cerkasah-bulo-cutno-vibuh-so-vidomo-pro-ataku-rf/; ; ; ; https://t.me/oleksandrkoval_rv/12089[50] https://t.me/Ukrenergo/5466[51] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/30/missile-alerts-cost-ukraine-businesses-halt[52] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-25-2026/[53] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-23-2026/[54] https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-27-2026/[55] dot ua/rubric-ato/4169586-retraslatori-u-bilorusi-dopomagaut-dronam-rf-biti-po-volini-vpritul-do-kordonu-z-polseu-demcenko.html[56] dot media/1415410-ukraina-otrimae-vid-belgii-f-16-rf-skinula-na-sumi-cotiri-kabi-1680-den-vijni/?anchor=live_1790751672&utm_source=copylink&utm_medium=ps ; youtube.com/live/QuO_LXCWhUk?si=wV1jwgU6FRvR4CBw ; dot com.ua/news/2026/09/30/8055696/[57] Source link Post navigation Accesorio de jonrones de hoy: mejores predicciones de jonrones de la MLB, selecciones para el miércoles de comodines Se revela el paquete FNAF Fortnite: todas las máscaras, precio y fecha de lanzamiento